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Abstract
Turbulence has been the hallmark of the course of Indonesian
economic growth. Indonesia was dubbed a “chronic drop-out” in
economic performance in 1968, but it then immediately em-
barked on a growth spurt. Just as accolades to Indonesia’s eco-
nomic pragmatism and economic orthodoxy were reaching a new
height, Indonesia’s economy shattered during the Asian financial
crisis of 1997–99. Indonesia has once again risen phoenix-like
from that disaster, and the bounce back has been resilient in the
face of the 2008 global financial crisis. Despite the commendable
progress, however, its growth seems to be hindered. Indonesia
must now tackle the two most important constraints to its con-
tinued high growth: logistics and infrastructure.
1. Background
More than four decades ago, Benjamin Higgins wrote an
assessment on Indonesia as one of the case studies in his
famous book, Economics Development (Higgins 1968). He
titled the chapter “Indonesia: The Chronic Drop-out” and
started with a rather dark picture: “Indonesia must surely
be accounted the number one economic failure among the
major underdeveloped countries” (Higgins 1968, 678).
Higgins laid out a long list of depressing facts: per capita
income in 1966 was less than that in 1938, budget deªcits
reached half of government expenditures, hyperinºation
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was one of the world’s worst cases, and so forth. He concluded that the reason for
Indonesia’s failure since the colonial period all the way until the 1960s was the ab-
sence of a needed combination of “big push,” economic leadership, and a political
framework that encourages entrepreneurship.
Another inºuential book came out almost 30 years later, written by Hal Hill: The
Indonesian Economy Since 1966 (Hill 1996). In stark contrast with Higgins’ gloomy
account, Hill’s was a story of success. According to Hill, “The Indonesia of the
mid 1990s is almost unrecognizable in a comparison with that of the mid 1960s” (Hill
1996, 3). Hill recorded high growth, rapid structural and technological change, and
dramatically reduced inºation. Furthermore, indicators of human welfare had im-
proved (e.g., poverty incidence fell sharply and education statistics showed promising
trends). He asserted that, despite some characterizing it as a “miracle” (e.g., World
Bank 1993), the recipe to Indonesia’s success is no great secret: It is pragmatism and
orthodoxy. He credited the success to the government, which provided a stable eco-
nomic and political environment, respected property rights, re-entered the interna-
tional community, reduced distortions in prices, and provided public goods.
Almost immediately after the publication of Hill’s book in 1996, however, the suc-
cessful country plunged into the catastrophe now known as the 1997–99 Asian
ªnancial crisis (AFC).1 The AFC practically collapsed Indonesia’s economy. Today,
more than a decade after that catastrophic crisis, Indonesia has stood up again. It
has even weathered the 2008 global ªnancial crisis (GFC) quite impressively. We ar-
gue in this paper, however, that Indonesia still faces many constraints, and these
constraints have been preventing the country from reaching higher economic
growth. Production networks have been expanding at a vigorous pace throughout
East Asia and hence enriching the region tremendously in the process. The trouble is
that Indonesia is lagging behind in its integration into these production networks.
Unless Indonesia removes the constraints that hold its competitiveness back, contin-
ued high growth will be threatened.
2. Macroeconomic management
2.1 Economic growth
During the period of 1986–95 Indonesia experienced impressive high economic
growth (i.e., around 6.8 percent on average), better than India, Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic (Lao PDR), the Philippines, and Vietnam. The AFC essentially ex-
ploded Indonesia’s economy, politics, and society; and the socio-political landscape
changed drastically—for example, becoming more democratic and transparent. In
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1 A second edition was quickly released in 2000 (Hill 2000).
the period of 2000–10, the average economic growth was 5.2 percent, slightly better
than Malaysia (5.0 percent), the Philippines (4.6 percent), and Thailand (4.4 percent).
Indonesia is one of the few countries with good economic performance in the after-
math of the recent GFC. It is projected that in 2011 Indonesia’s economic growth will
record an impressive growth of around 6.2 percent (IMF 2010).
Indonesia’s GDP breakdown by expenditure is depicted in Table 1. By far, private
consumption expenditure is still the biggest contributor (measured as share to
GDP). The gross ªxed capital formation that had been on the rise during 1993–97
recorded a 28.5 percent share in 1997, but then plunged to only 17.8 percent amidst
the crisis. Since then it gradually recovered, and by 2010 it contributed 24 percent to
GDP, despite a small hiccup in 2009 due to the GFC. In fact, the growth of invest-
ment spending has become the major driver of GDP growth in 2010, with a growth
rate consistently faster than overall growth (McLeod 2011). Another important im-
provement is that of trade. In 1993 export contributed only 37.6 percent to GDP and
import contributed 29.1 percent. In 2010 both export and import rose signiªcantly,
with contributions of 46.4 percent and 36 percent to GDP, respectively.
2.2 Monetary policy and banking
Throughout the last decade, Bank Indonesia has helped to keep the Indonesian
macroeconomy fairly stable, characterized by reasonably low inºation rates and rel-
atively stable rupiah exchange rates. Bank Indonesia seems to have achieved this
rather inefªciently, however. In the period 2000–08, for example, the SBI interest rate
(SBIs are the short-term money certiªcates issued by Bank Indonesia) was con-
stantly higher than the time deposit rate of commercial banks, as shown in Figure 1.
It is uncommon that Bank Indonesia’s instrument, which is less risky, earned a
higher return than that of commercial banks. An SBI rate that is higher induces the
commercial banks to put their money in SBI rather than lending it out to debtors.
The loan-to-deposit ratio of commercial banks was extremely low—at around 30
percent to 50 percent in the period 2000–04 (by now, however, it has increased to
around 77 percent). The high rate of SBI also induces foreign capital inºow that
brings the risk of a “hot money” problem. This situation was the case for 8 years, be-
fore it broke in January 2009 after the GFC hit Indonesia. Therefore although the
policy to keep the SBI rate higher than the time deposit rate has been effective in ab-
sorbing money from circulation, this policy should really be implemented only in a
crisis situation, rather than during normal conditions.
Another much-discussed issue regarding monetary and banking policy is the rela-
tively wide spread between the bank lending rate and the deposit rate. For a long
time now, it has remained at around 5 percent to 6 percent. Businesses have been
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complaining about the high lending rates. The rather oligopolistic Indonesian bank-
ing structure (there are 15 commercial banks with around 80 percent of the market
share) might have exacerbated the problem.
2.3 Fiscal policy and government ªnancing
The Indonesian government has succeeded in reducing its dependence on debt from
89 percent of GDP in 2000 to around 30 percent currently—a low ratio by interna-
tional standards (Ashcroft and Cavanough 2008). In 1998 the Indonesian govern-
ment started issuing government bonds as a new ªnancing instrument. These bonds
(called Surat Berharga Negara) were ªrst used to recapitalize insolvent banks
taken over by the government. At that time they were denominated almost exclu-
sively in rupiah. Since 2004, the government has also issued foreign currency
denominated securities.
At the end of 2009 there were Rp 724.90 trillion worth of tradable bonds and
Rp 254.56 trillion worth of non-tradable bonds. There were Rp 581.75 trillion of
domestic bonds and Rp 143.15 trillion of foreign bonds (USD 14.85 billion and
JPY 35 billion) that were tradable. By the end of 2009 government debt had
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Figure 1. Interest rates
Source: Compiled from CEIC database.
amounted to USD 170.7 billion—USD 88.3 billion of which was denominated in
rupiah and the rest in foreign currencies.
The government seems to have set the bond prices too low, however. For some pe-
riod the difference between yields of government bonds and the SBI rate was re-
markably wide, such as in the period of October 2008–June 2009. This wide a gap
raises a question of efªciency; both SBI and government bonds are risk-free and
hence their return should not be too far apart. Now, however, the government has
been better in establishing the bond price.
Of particular concern in ªscal policy is the consistently large portion allocated for
subsidy (Patunru 2010). Obviously subsidies are often needed for development pur-
poses, especially to ensure the sufªcient provision of public goods. As shown in Ta-
ble 2, however, the subsidy allocation is high (i.e., between 2.5 to 3 percent of GDP).
This is higher than the budget deªcit of around 1.5–2.2 percent of GDP. Energy sub-
sidy takes up a huge portion of the total subsidy (with fuel subsidy dominating the
total energy subsidy). The subsidized non-energy items include food, fertilizer, and
seeds. It is obvious that this “subsidy regime” in the budget is not sustainable, as a
big portion of the budget is used for non-productive uses. Infrastructure, for exam-
ple, is the sector mostly in need of a big spending allocation. Unfortunately, only
about 8 percent of total government spending goes to infrastructure development,
which is far below that allocated for energy subsidy (13–20 percent) (Thee and
Negara 2010).
2.4 Foreign trade and capital ºow
Indonesian export and import performance has risen signiªcantly in recent years.
Table 3 shows that there has been a shift in Indonesia’s exports in terms of commod-
ities. In 1993 and prior, Indonesia relied on the export of petroleum and gas—
around 26.48 percent of total export. In 2010 the contribution of this commodity di-
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Table 2. Subsidies in the national budget
2009 2010 2011
(Actual) (Revised) (Proposed)
Total subsidies (USD bn) 13.3 22.0 19.9
percent of GDP 2.5 3.2 2.6
percent of expenditures 14.7 18.0 15.4
Energy (USD bn) 9.1 15.7 14.4
Fuel (USD bn) 4.3 9.7 10.0
Electricity (USD bn) 4.8 6.0 4.4
Non-energy 4.2 6.3 5.5
Memo:
Exchange rate (IDR/USD) 10,408 9,200 9,300
Budget deªcit (percent of GDP) 1.6 2.2 1.7
Source: Government of Indonesia (GOI) (various years), Patunru (2010).
minished to 17.78 percent. The remaining 82.22 percent exports consist of agricul-
ture goods (3.17 percent), industrial goods (62.14 percent), and mining and others
(16.91 percent). Shifts in sub-commodities are also apparent. In 1993 commodities
like cork and wood, cork manufactures; textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, and
related products; and articles of apparel and clothing accessories, contributed
signiªcantly to the total export with more than 30 percent share. Their share in 2009
dropped to only 9.45 percent, however. On the other hand, commodities such as
coal, coke and briquettes, and ªxed vegetables, oils, and fats have risen signiªcantly.
Furthermore, as shown in Table 4, import of petroleum, petroleum products, and re-
lated materials increased signiªcantly, from 7.66 percent in 1993 to 19.27 percent in
2009. The current estimate for the contribution of this commodity in 2010 is around
20.18 percent. Table 4 also shows that the import of “other transport equipment” has
also more than doubled from 1993 to 2009. But import contribution of machinery
that is specialized for particular industries has dropped to 4.36 percent. This could
mean that domestic industries have been able to supply the machinery. In 2010 im-
port of consumer goods was around 7.37 percent, raw material/supporting material
72.78 percent, and capital goods around 19.85 percent
3. Structural change
3.1 Sectoral transformation
Table 5 reports sectoral growth performance. The agriculture sector was 16.8 percent
of GDP in 1993 and 13.8 percent of GDP in 2007. Agriculture employs more than
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Table 3. Major exports (percent of total)
SITC Commodity 1993 2000 2005 2009
03 Fish, crustacean and mollusks, and preparations thereof 3.86 2.56 2.10 1.93
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures thereof 2.33 1.79 1.73 2.37
23 Crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed) 2.66 1.47 3.05 2.82
28 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 2.44 3.18 5.30 5.61
32 Coal, coke, and briquettes 1.75 2.09 5.08 11.87
33 Petroleum, petroleum products, and related materials 15.47 12.50 11.93 8.75
34 Gas, natural and manufactured 11.01 10.67 10.69 7.67
42 Fixed vegetable oils and fats 1.92 2.66 5.56 10.18
51 Organic chemicals 0.66 1.84 1.91 1.58
63 Cork and wood, cork manufactures 13.94 5.20 3.12 1.55
64 Paper, paperboard, and articles of pulp, of paper/of paperboard 1.34 3.71 2.72 2.92
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, nes, and related products 7.22 5.66 4.04 2.76
68 Non-ferrous metals 0.80 1.58 3.03 3.42
75 Ofªce machines and automatic data processing equipment 0.43 4.90 3.43 1.37
76 Telecommunications, sound recording and reproducing equipment 2.62 5.64 3.59 3.35
77 Electric machinery, apparatus and appliances nes, and parts nes 1.19 4.08 4.72 3.47
82 Furniture and parts thereof 1.84 2.46 2.17 1.43
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 9.67 7.74 6.03 5.14
85 Footwear 4.42 2.59 1.57 1.45
89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles, nes 2.15 2.25 1.68 1.60
Source: Compiled from UN-COMTRADE database.
Note: nes  not elsewhere speciªed.
40 percent of the labor force and contains roughly 65 percent of the poor people.
Agricultural output grew only around 3 percent annually. The composition of
growth in Table 5 raises concern because recent growth seems to be supported
mostly by sectors (electricity, transport, and telecommunications) that absorb only a
few workers.
There are still around 40 million people working in the agriculture sector in Indone-
sia. Many of the farmers are working peasants with no or insufªcient land, and their
real wages are almost constant while real wages in other sectors are increasing. Cer-
tainly the best support and protection for farmers is through assistance on improv-
ing their skill and productivity. Such programs were conducted two or three de-
cades ago but apparently now the government prefers a price subsidy mechanism
(mostly price support for crops and fertilizers, along with occasional trade protec-
tion). Although such price subsidies might be justiªed in the short term, it will not
be sufªcient to improve well-being in the long run.
3.2 Industrial transformation
Indonesia’s industrial transformation took place most notably in 1993–2009.
Table 6 reports that there was a movement away from labor-intensive and resource-
intensive industries to capital-intensive industries in the composition of Indonesia’s
major manufactured exports. The share of resource-intensive industries dropped
from 27.9 percent in 1993 to 5.8 percent in 2009, and the share of labor-intensive in-
dustries dropped from 59.7 percent to 55.3 percent. Consequently, capital-intensive
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Table 4. Major imports (percent of total)
SITC Commodity 1993 2000 2005 2009
4 Cereals and cereal preparations 1.93 3.28 1.86 1.91
8 Feeding stuff for animals (not including un-milled cereals) 1.18 1.45 1.43 1.73
25 Pulp and waste paper 1.69 3.18 1.36 0.98
26 Textile ªbers (not wool tops) and their wastes (not in yarn) 2.82 3.00 1.39 1.22
33 Petroleum, petroleum products, and related materials 7.66 18.39 30.60 19.27
51 Organic chemicals 4.26 7.39 5.48 3.89
58 Artiªcial resins and plastic materials, and cellulose esters etc. 3.51 3.26 2.72 2.75
59 Chemical materials and products, nes 1.84 1.88 1.42 1.41
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, nes, and related products 3.99 3.75 1.31 2.89
67 Iron and steel 5.58 4.86 6.59 5.24
68 Non-ferrous metals 1.83 1.85 1.52 1.67
69 Manufactures of metals, nes 2.25 1.70 1.63 2.07
71 Power generating machinery and equipment 5.71 2.81 2.96 3.58
72 Machinery specialized for particular industries 10.72 5.47 4.88 4.36
74 General industrial machinery and equipment nes & parts of nes 7.66 5.28 5.05 5.49
75 Ofªce machines and automatic data processing equipment 0.71 0.64 0.89 2.31
76 Telecommunications, sound recording and reproducing equipment 3.53 1.20 2.43 4.81
77 Electric machinery, apparatus and appliances nes, and parts nes 6.04 2.78 2.83 5.89
78 Road vehicles 4.67 5.53 5.26 3.96
79 Other transport equipment 2.75 3.16 1.43 6.19
Source: Compiled from UN-COMTRADE database.
Note: nes  not elsewhere speciªed.
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industries rose from 12.3 percent in 1993 to 38.9 percent in 2009. There is therefore
the justiªed concern about job creation in the industrial sector.
The domestic manufacturing industry is currently facing a slow down, it had gone
from 23.5 percent of GDP in 1993 to peak at 28.4 percent in 2004 and then fell
steadily to 27.4 percent. The manufacturing industry had grown 9–12 percent dur-
ing 1993–96 but, post-AFC, grew only 2.11 percent to 6.38 percent in 2000–10. In re-
sponse to the diminishing performance of the manufacturing industry (or “de-
industrialization” as some observers dub it), the government has launched a series
of policies to boost the development of the industry through industrial revitalization
programs, improving the investment climate, and accelerating infrastructure devel-
opment programs. The full impact of all this is not yet clear.
3.3 Decentralization
Another aspect of Indonesia’s structural change is regional decentralization, where
some of the development tasks are delegated to regional authorities. This “big-
bang” decentralization began in 2001. In practice, the country devolved administra-
tive, ªscal, and political control to over 480 district-level governments, while
keeping control over defense, national security, foreign policy, monetary policy,
ªnance, development planning, justice, and the police in the hands of the
central government.
Although the objective is well justiªed—namely, to let people in local regions take
charge of their own developmental needs—some unintended consequences have oc-
curred. For example, coordination between the central government and regional
government becomes less manageable. Some regional governments even set their
own objective function without coordinating it with the central government’s
agenda. Many regional governments also issue their own regulation or by-laws that
contradict the central government level and hence exacerbate uncertainties that in
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Table 6. Major manufactured exports (percent of total)
Classiªcation 1993 2000 2005 2009
Resource-intensive 27.92 11.01 8.52 5.81
Labor-intensive 59.74 58.44 56.79 55.29
Capital-intensive 12.33 30.56 34.69 38.90
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data compiled from UN-COMTRADE.
Note: Continuing on Hill (1996), the following classiªcations are used: Resource-intensive are SITC items 61, 63, 66 (excluding
664–6), and 671.
Labor-intensive are SITC items 54, 55, 65, 664–6, 695–7, 749, 76–7, 793, 81–5, and 89.
Capital-intensive are SITC items 5 (excluding 54 and 55), 62, 64, 67 (excluding 671), 69 (excluding 695–7), 7 (excluding 76–8),
and 86–8. In the interest of longer time-span, we use SITC Rev 2.
turn degrade the investment climate. Investors have complained that they must
comply with too many regulations, which translates into higher transaction costs.
Our opinion is that the most important step in minimizing this negative conse-
quence is to improve the skills of local governments in drafting local regulations,
and to implement stronger monitoring and strict enforcement (Brodjonegoro 2004).
4. Social development
Currently, more than half of Indonesia’s population is still poor, measured with the
USD 2 purchasing power parity/day poverty line. It is better than India, Lao PDR,
and Cambodia, but worse than China, the Philippines, and Vietnam (Table 7). The
two measures of income inequality show Indonesia is comparable to Vietnam,2 but
more inequitable than India.
Poverty in Indonesia has three salient features (World Bank 2006). First, there is a
large number of Indonesians vulnerable to poverty. That is, poor people just above
the poverty line are sensitive to the change in the line. As a result, mobility of the
near-poor to join the poor (and vice versa) is high. Using panel data from the peri-
ods 2002–04 and 2005–07, a study by Suselo and Tarsidin (2008a) revealed that some
portion of poverty is not sufªciently acknowledged. They decomposed the poverty
into “chronic” (i.e., poor for 3 consecutive years; due to limitation of panel data
period, population was only identiªed for 3 years) and “transitory” (i.e., poor for
1 year or poor for 2 years, either consecutive or not). They found that 24–25 percent
of the people are transiently poor and 4–5 percent are chronically poor. In total, the
Head Count Ratio (HCR) for poverty for the 3 years covered was 29 percent. The
67 Asian Economic Papers
Recent Indonesian Economic Development and the Urgent Need to Remove Key Growth Obstacles
2 Comparison of Gini coefªcients across countries should be taken with caution as the survey
conducted in each country to generate the coefªcient may be different in methodology and
in data used for measurement.
Table 7. Poverty and inequality: Indonesia in comparison
Country
Percent of population below
USD 2 (PPP)/day
Income ratio of highest
20 percent to lowest 20 percent Gini coefªcient
China 35.7 (2005) 8.3 (2005) 0.415 (2005)
India 75.6 (2005) 5.6 (2005) 0.368 (2005)
Indonesia 54.6 (2005) 6.2 (2007) 0.376 (2007)
Lao PDR 76.9 (2002) 4.9 (2002) 0.326 (2002)
Cambodia 57.8 (2007) 8.1 (2007) 0.442 (2007)
Malaysia 7.8 (2004) 7.0 (2004) 0.379 (2004)
Philippines 45.0 (2006) 9.0 (2006) 0.440 (2006)
Thailand 11.5 (2004) 8.1 (2004) 0.425 (2004)
Vietnam 48.4 (2006) 6.4 (2006) 0.378 (2006)
Source: ADB (2010).
Note: PPP  purchasing power parity.
number is both surprising and worrying, for it implies that there are too many Indo-
nesian people on the brink of ofªcial poverty. Suryahadi et al. (2011) conªrm this.
They found that 47 percent of the poor in 2008 stayed poor in 2009, and 53 percent
graduated to near-poor and non-poor. But 49 percent of the poor in 2009 were not
poor in 2008.
Second, non-income poverty is a more serious problem than income poverty. This
includes high malnutrition rates, poor maternal health, weak education outcomes,
and low access to safe and clean water and sanitation. All the non-income poverty
measures, except unhygienic ºoor (e.g., soil ºoor),3 are worse than monetary pov-
erty (Suryahadi et al. 2011). Furthermore, such non-income poverty is more preva-
lent in rural areas.
Third, regional disparities in poverty in Indonesia are considerable. The poverty in-
cidence is far higher in eastern Indonesia, but most of the poor live in western Indo-
nesia. For example, the 2009 poverty rate in Java/Bali was 13.7 percent (down from
15.7 percent in 2004) whereas the rate in the remote Papua was 37.1 percent (down
from 38.7 percent in 2004). But Java/Bali is home to 57 percent of Indonesia’s poor,
and Papua has only 3 percent (Table 8).
The persistence of poverty is partly related to the structural change of the Indone-
sian economy. Roughly 62 percent of Indonesian poor people are engaged in agri-
culture (in its broad deªnition, including livestock, forestry, and ªshery), which is
less productive compared with the others. Many peasants do not have land or they
own insufªcient land to earn a living. Some peasants therefore shift to other jobs in
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3 “Soil ºoor” is the original phrase used by the cited authors. It refers to a house ºoor that is
far below today’s standard average house in urban areas. For example, the ºoor is actually
hardened soil.
Table 8. Regional poverty 2009
Rural
(%)
Urban
(%)
Total
(%)
Per capita
income:
Rural
Per capita
income:
Urban
Sumatra 15.0 12.2 13.9 357 558
Java-Bali 17.7 10.6 13.7 294 543
Nusa Tenggara 22.4 24.6 23.0 253 405
Kalimantan 9.1 5.1 7.5 376 697
Sulawesi 18.3 6.7 14.8 275 570
Maluku 25.9 7.5 20.9 313 591
Papua 46.3 5.9 37.1 315 707
Indonesia 18.9 10.7 14.1 311 550
Source: BPS (2010), Resosudarmo and Yusuf (2009).
Note: Per capita income in Rp ’000 (2008 prices).
search of a better living. With a low level of education and/or skills, some of them
fail to meet job requirements and ªnally wind up being unemployed.
The unemployment rate has remained high for a long period (Figure 2). Since the
AFC, the unemployment rate has increased signiªcantly and it has been slow to re-
verse. The current unemployment rate is around 7 percent, which is far higher than
that in the 1980s. Tarsidin (2009) decomposes unemployment into structural and cy-
clical unemployment and ªnds that Indonesia is currently experiencing structural
unemployment generated by the structural change of the Indonesian economy. In-
dustries have become more capital-intensive and hence require better and higher
education and/or skills. Therefore the re-allocation of labor from agriculture to in-
dustry is constrained.
The dichotomy of rural and urban economy is also responsible for poverty and in-
come inequality in Indonesia. The rural economy, characterized with agricultural ac-
tivities, does not have a tight linkage with the urban economy. Farmers are merely
sellers of agricultural crops and consumers of manufactured goods from the urban
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Figure 2. Unemployment
Source: Compiled from CEIC database.
economy. For some who are engaged in non-agricultural activities, it is only on a
small scale and serves a narrow market. The urban economy does not adequately
leverage the income generating capacity of people living in rural areas. This implies
that the urban economy’s support to enhance economic growth in rural areas is lim-
ited. Suselo and Tarsidin (2008a) show that where people live also determines their
poverty status. In 2004, by living in an urban area, the probability of a household
not becoming poor would increase 4.01 percent compared to if they had lived in a
rural area. In 2007 this probability increased to 16.80 percent.
Suselo and Tarsidin (2008b) show that the agriculture sector is the highest contribu-
tor of poverty in almost all regions. It is also the most responsive sector, with its
high growth elasticity of poverty reduction—that is, every 1 percent growth of the
sector could reduce 2.97 percent of the HCR. As a comparison, 1 percent growth in
the manufacturing sector can reduce 0.11 percent of the HCR.
Many programs have been launched to reduce poverty, such as direct cash transfer,
conditional cash transfer (both at household and at community level), and programs
to provide cheap education, health services, clean water, and micro-ªnancing. Al-
though the programs contribute to an overall policy to reduce poverty, most of them
are ad hoc and short-term in nature. For people living in a rural area (most of them
are involved in the agricultural sector) low productivity and low added value of
their output are the main problems. As for those living in an urban area, the prob-
lem is ªnding a job with little or no education or expertise. The challenge in a
longer-term perspective is therefore to have a well-functioning social protection pro-
gram. This is important not just for poverty eradication but it is also needed as a
complement to making the otherwise rigid labor market more ºexible.
5. The supply constraints: logistics and infrastructure4
Basri and Patunru (2008) argue that the constraints on economic growth in Indone-
sia lie more in the supply side rather than in the demand side. Indonesia is a
beneªciary of the expansion of the production networks that is occurring in East
Asia; and, in order to take full advantage of these production networks, Indonesia
has to improve its investment climate and to relax “supply constraints.” The two
most important supply constraints are the logistics system and the infrastructure
system. The logistics system includes input logistics (non-production-related costs
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4 Part of this section borrows from Patunru’s address to the workshop on “Improving Supply
Chain Connectivity Across APEC Economies Through Open and Competitive Services,”
Manila, 22–24 September 2010, and Hanoi, 27–29 September 2010.
of acquiring raw material and capital goods [e.g., the cost of transporting inputs
from factor market to the production plant]), in-house logistics (e.g., inventory sys-
tem, labor management), and output logistics (costs incurred while transporting
goods to the ªnal markets). The infrastructure system refers to hard infrastructure
(e.g., roads, ports, bridges) and soft infrastructure (the management of roads, ports,
bridges, etc.). These two constraints have made transportation of goods very costly
(e.g., Indonesia’s trucking costs are the highest in ASEAN). The country has failed to
capitalize on its unique archipelagic geography by not having a primary interna-
tional hub port, by not having adequate capacity at its domestic ports, and by not
managing the domestic ports efªciently.
5.1 Indonesia in the midst of regional economic integration
Fung, Iizaka, and Siu (2010) have documented the integration process of East Asia
masterfully. The shares of East Asian imports and exports that are absorbed within
the region have increased from 23 percent and 26 percent, respectively, in 1985 to 45
percent and 41 percent, respectively, in 2006. In contrast, the shares of East Asia im-
ports from North America and EU-15 have dropped from 17 percent and 14 percent,
respectively, in 1985 to 10 percent and 10 percent, respectively, in 2006. The share of
East Asian exports to North America has decreased from 29 percent to 18 percent
and the share of East Asian exports to EU-15 has increased a little bit from 11 per-
cent to 14 percent. Of particular interest is the role of China. East Asia’s import share
from China increased from a mere 6 percent in 1985 to 16 percent in 2006, and the
export share to China has increased from 5 percent to 13 percent. On the other hand,
East Asia’s import share from Japan has dropped from 26 percent to 14 percent and
export from 17 percent to 9 percent. Clearly, there has been a big switch away from
East Asia’s reliance on the North American markets toward itself and from Japan
to China.
Indonesia’s trade pattern has followed the same general trends in East Asia. Indone-
sian import from and export to East Asia increased markedly from 17 percent and
18 percent to 46 percent and 37 percent from 1985 to 2006 (see Table 9). Corre-
sponding ªgures with respect to North America are 19 percent and 22 percent to
17 percent and 19 percent. Indonesia’s trade with China is also increasing (2 percent
and 0.5 percent to 7 percent and 10 percent) while trade with Japan is decreasing
(26 percent and 46 percent to 14 percent and 17 percent), even though in absolute
terms the latter still dominates (not shown).
We now present two types of evidence to suggest that Indonesia is not participating
adequately in the expansion of the production networks. The ªrst type of evidence
is to compare the degree that Indonesia trades with the rest of East Asia compared
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with the neighboring ASEAN countries of Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Singapore. The share of national exports going to East Asia in 2006 is 37 percent for
Indonesia, 35 percent for Thailand, 43 percent for Malaysia, 53 percent for Singa-
pore, and 41 percent for the Philippines (see Table 9). As the Indonesian share is
higher than that of only Thailand, it is likely that Indonesia is lagging behind other
ASEAN countries in joining the production networks.
The second type of evidence that Indonesia is lagging in its participation in produc-
tion networks is obtained from the comparison between the growth rate of total
trade and the growth rate of trade in parts and components. When the expansion of
trade is driven by the expansion of trade in parts and components, then the growth
rate of the former is lower than the growth rate of the latter. According to Fung et al.
(2010), the average growth rate of imports of intermediate goods in Asian nations in
1998–2007 was 14 percent and that of ªnal goods was 10 percent. The corresponding
growth rates for exports were 13 percent for intermediate goods and 12 percent for
ªnal goods. For the world as a whole, the growth rate for imports was 10 percent for
intermediate goods and 9 percent for ªnal goods; and the growth rate for export
was 10 percent for intermediate goods and 9.5 percent for ªnal goods. For Indone-
sia, however, the average growth rate of import was 12 percent for ªnal goods and
10 percent for intermediate goods; and the average growth rate of export was 9 per-
cent for ªnal goods and 13 percent for intermediate goods. So, although on the ex-
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Table 9. Southeast Asian integration (shares of import and export, in percent)
Countries Year East Asia NIEs ASEAN4 N. America EU15
Singapore 1985
1995
2003
2006
32.6 | 31.4
36.5 | 44.2
46.8 | 53.4
49.2 | 54.7
6.8 | 9.3
11.8 | 15.4
10.7 | 17.1
12.5 | 16.7
17.2 | 20.6
21.5 | 26.5
28.0 | 30.0
25.3 | 28.2
15.5 | 21.9
15.5 | 18.8
13.6 | 13.1
13.1 | 10.5
12.2 | 11.0
13.4 | 13.4
11.7 | 12.1
10.9 | 10.6
Thailand 1985
1995
2003
2006
23.4 | 25.6
24.7 | 30.9
33.4 | 34.7
36.3 | 35.3
13.7 | 15.4
15.3 | 23.0
13.8 | 17.9
13.6 | 16.6
7.2 | 6.3
6.4 | 4.9
11.6 | 9.7
12.1 | 9.6
12.6 | 20.9
12.7 | 18.9
10.0 | 18.2
7.1 | 16.0
16.1 | 19.8
15.9 | 15.1
10.0 | 14.7
8.4 | 13.0
Malaysia 1985
1995
2003
2006
31.0 | 36.4
31.0 | 40.4
45.9 | 43.0
49.7 | 43.1
22.4 | 29.1
23.7 | 31.6
25.1 | 28.7
25.2 | 26.7
6.6 | 6.3
5.0 | 6.2
12.0 | 7.8
12.5 | 9.2
16.4 | 13.7
17.1 | 21.5
16.0 | 20.2
13.0 | 19.4
16.1 | 14.9
15.6 | 14.2
11.8 | 12.1
11.1 | 12.1
Philippines 1985
1995
2003
2006
30.6 | 20.6
29.2 | 24.6
35.5 | 42.4
43.4 | 41.3
13.7 | 12.9
21.0 | 16.2
20.8 | 21.5
23.9 | 20.9
11.5 | 6.1
5.9 | 7.2
10.2 | 7.7
11.3 | 8.2
25.9 | 37.5
19.9 | 37.4
9.3 | 12.7
7.8 | 11.7
9.3 | 16.2
10.7 | 16.9
10.9 | 13.1
9.7 | 11.5
Indonesia 1985
1995
2003
2006
17.2 | 18.4
24.6 | 31.0
40.1 | 35.4
46.0 | 37.3
13.5 | 16.1
17.0 | 22.2
21.5 | 25.5
26.2 | 22.4
1.2 | 1.9
3.9 | 5.0
9.4 | 11.0
10.0 | 9.1
18.7 | 22.0
13.7 | 14.7
22.4 | 21.0
16.6 | 18.9
19.0 | 6.4
20.1 | 14.9
8.1 | 16.3
8.3 | 18.0
Source: Fung, Iizaka, and Siu (2010).
Note: The ªrst numbers indicate “import from” and the second “export to.”
port side Indonesia has been following the trend (i.e., export of intermediate goods
grew higher than that of ªnal goods), the import side showed the opposite.
5.2 The sources of non-competitiveness
In our opinion, the most important reason for Indonesia’s inadequate participation
in the expansion of production networks in East Asia is the backwardness of the lo-
gistic system and the infrastructure system in Indonesia. One symptom of the back-
wardness of the two systems is the absence of domestic connectivity, as evidenced
by the stark differences in prices for basic commodities across space. Table 10 re-
ports that the price of medium rice was around Rp 4,000 in Java, Kalimantan,
Sulawesi, and Nusa Tenggara but was Rp 10,000 in remote Paniai (in Papua).
According to the World Economic Forum (2009), Indonesia ranked 54 out of 134
countries in terms of competitiveness. Indonesia is less competitive than Thailand,
Malaysia, Singapore, and China, and more competitive than Vietnam and the Philip-
pines. The top culprits for Indonesia’s low competitiveness rank are inefªcient gov-
ernment bureaucracy and an inadequate supply of infrastructure. In terms of logis-
tic performance, Indonesia is the worst in ASEAN. Its Logistic Performance Index
rank in 2010 is 75—that is, behind Singapore (2), Malaysia (29), Thailand (35), the
Philippines (44), and Vietnam (53). Indonesia also lags behind its neighbors in cus-
toms, infrastructure, and international shipments. According to the World Bank
(2008), the processing time needed for export in Indonesia is 21 days, compared
with 9.8 days in the OECD, even though the numbers of documents needed are
roughly the same.
Table 11 reports that the ranking of overall infrastructure in Indonesia slipped
signiªcantly in 2009, dropping from being 46 in 2008 to 96 in 2009. This fall in rank-
ing occurred despite improvements in many dimensions (e.g., in 2008, Indonesia
ranked 105 for roads and 104 for ports, and in 2009 it ranked 94 and 95).
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Table 10. Disconnected markets of Indonesia (prices in IDR)
Rice Wheat ºour Sugar Cooking oil Salt Cement
E. Jawa 4,250 3,800 6,000 4,450 1,600 38,000
W. Kalimantan 4,400 4,000 5,800 4,500 2,400 37,500
E. Kalimantan 4,500 4,000 6,500 4,500 2,000 30,000
S. Sulawesi 4,400 3,500 5,800 4,500 2,000 30,500
E. NusaTenggara 4,200 4,500 7,000 6,300 2,000 31,000
Merauke 5,000 7,000 7,000 6,670 3,000 62,000
Nabire 6,000 10,000 11,000 11,000 4,000 23,000
Paniai 10,000 7,500 8,000 7,000 8,000 60,000
Source: Basri (2010).
In a study on land transportation costs, the Institute for Economic and Social Re-
search (LPEM-FEUI 2008) found that trucking costs in Indonesia (a number of prov-
inces in Sulawesi, Java, and Sumatra were sampled) could reach as high as USD 0.34
per kilometer. This is higher than the average trucking cost in ASEAN, USD 0.22 per
kilometer (Carana Corporation 2004). One would reasonably guess that for an
archipelagic country like Indonesia, river and sea transportation would be cheaper.
This proved not to be true because LPEM-FEUI (2010) found that the cost could
reach even higher at USD 0.50 per kilometer. The Indonesian archipelago is passed
by world shipping lines. Nevertheless, thus far there is no primary international hub
port. Patunru, Nurridzki, and Rivayani (2009) posited that difªcult topography as
well as bad management caused this. For example, in Semarang (Central Java),
dredging and widening the port is not possible because of the topographical nature
of the location (sandy, etc.), and the existing port management company, the state-
owned Indonesian Port Corporation, has no incentives to improve its performance.
An interesting study by De (2009) reveals that most Indonesian ports impose quite a
signiªcant amount of “auxiliary charges” in addition to base charges. Such auxiliary
charges include container handling charges and government duties (base charges
refer to fares set by shipping lines). The auxiliary charges in Indonesian ports can
take up more than 40 percent of the total freight costs. For example, it costs USD 841
to send goods from Indonesia to China in a 20-foot container, and 43 percent of the
cost is auxiliary charges. On the other hand, shipping goods from China to Indone-
sia costs USD 500, again with 43 percent going to auxiliary charges.
Another study, LPEM-FEUI (2005), found that the total logistic costs were around
14 percent of the production costs in Indonesia, compared with less than 5 percent
in Japan. The study broke down the logistic costs into input logistics (from raw ma-
terial and capital good vendor to processing plant), in-house logistics (within the
ªrm itself), and output logistics (from ªrm to the marketplace). It was found that
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Table 11. Rankings of infrastructure quality (2008: 134 countries; 2009: 133 countries)
Indonesia
The
Philippines Malaysia Vietnam China
2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
Quality of infrastructure (overall) 46 96 94 98 19 27 97 111 58 66
Quality of roads 105 94 94 104 17 24 102 102 51 50
Quality of railroad infrastructure 58 60 85 92 17 19 66 58 28 27
Quality of port infrastructure 104 95 100 112 16 19 112 99 54 61
Quality of airport infrastructure 75 68 89 100 20 27 92 84 74 80
Quality of electricity infrastructure 82 96 82 87 71 39 104 103 68 61
Telephone lines 100 79 105 103 31 72 37 36 47 49
Source: World Economic Forum (2009).
both input and output logistics are the main contributors, accounting for 7 percent
and 4 percent, respectively, of production costs. This implies that the bulk of logistic
costs are beyond the ªrm’s control (e.g., lack of road and port capacity, illegal collec-
tion, and retribution on the street). LPEM-FEUI (2009) found that informal pay-
ments could vary from rupiah 23,000 (for imported goods that go through the
“green lane”—less hurdled line) to rupiah 1.5 million (in the “red lane”—more in-
spected). This all suggests that improvement of the logistics services in ports should
not focus only on the hard infrastructure but also on the soft infrastructure (the
management) as well.5
Not surprisingly, transportation has been identiªed as the second most severe obsta-
cle to economic growth after macroeconomic instability (LPEM-FEUI 2008). Trans-
portation issues are even more important than labor and tax issues.
6. Final remarks
Hal Hill (1996, 251) conjectured that Indonesia’s slow growth during the post-1988
East Asian boom was the result of “serious supply-side bottleneck” (Hill 1996, 251).
This paper has argued that this situation of supply constraints is even more impor-
tant today. The logistics system and the infrastructure system must be improved
rapidly and comprehensively if Indonesia is to realize its growth potential.
This paper has been rather silent on politics and participation in international eco-
nomic governance. Indonesia’s politics are more stable now than in the past,
although adjustments to various drastic reforms (e.g., regional decentralization of
economic and political governance) are still in progress. Indonesia has become in-
creasingly active in international forums such as ASEAN, APEC, and G20. All these
are in parallel with the country’s involvement in the regional economic production
networks. Indonesia has started to embrace the opportunity of international
market access.6
Indonesia’s export and import structure will keep transforming as the country in-
creasingly engages in the regional and global production networks. This engage-
ment requires better preparation by the Indonesian government.
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5 Additional payments are perceived to be the main obstacle in ship clearance. Patunru,
Nurridzki, and Rivayani (2009) noted that 75 percent of respondents reported additional
payments from vessel arrival until leaving the port as being a severe obstacle. Around
55 percent complained about the port infrastructure. In the case of cargo clearance, 84 per-
cent of respondents said that additional payment inside the port has been a major obstacle.
6 On a recent political development, see, for example, Patunru and von Luebke (2010).
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